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pAbstract
Research on ethical, legal and social aspects (ELSA) of life sciences and new technologies
has mainly been focused on impacts and consequences, while the emerging framework
of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) focuses rather on increased involvement
and reflexivity in research processes to foster science and technology that better
answers the needs of society. I argue that philosophy of science should be a
central feature of RRI and demonstrate how the philosophy of science can contribute
in this sense. I show how investigating basic assumptions in research, here exemplified
by reductive assumptions in causal modeling, can have important ethical and
societal implications.
Keywords: Causation; ELSA; Ethics; Nanomedicine; Philosophy of science; Reduction;
Root cause; RRIIntroduction
Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) is a framework for European research
in new and emerging areas of science and technology that has been proposed as an
alternative to the ELSA mode of addressing Ethical, Legal and Societal Aspects of
new scientific developments. While ELSA mainly takes issues with various impacts of
science on society, the RRI framework places more weight on the process of research
and innovation, aiming at larger involvement and reflexivity while emphasizing openness,
transparency and dialogue (Sutcliffe 2011; European Commission 2012; Von Schomberg
2013). It also comprises a move from the mainly external and theoretical approaches
of the ELSA framework to more integrated projects, in which aspects of RRI will be
incorporated into science research projects. A suggestion is that science conducted
within an RRI framework will meet the interests and goals of society more effectively
by opening up the process.
Some central RRI values have been suggested and discussed. However, what is the
more specific content of RRI is largely left open. Some will for this reason deem the
concept too vague, but giving an exact definition of RRI is not necessarily fruitful.
Leaving it open for particular projects to define RRI relative to their research context
and in cooperation with various stakeholders, is one way to create discussions
particularly relevant to the projects at hand. Taking this perspective, how RRI is2014 Oftedal; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
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project to project.
RRI approaches still need some common ground, and I want here to make the case for
establishing philosophy of science research as a central feature of RRI, not least because
openness, transparency, and a broader involvement in research and innovation will
require methods, assumptions, and values in research to be explicit, understood, and
discussed. An RRI perspective will allow for asking foundational questions regarding
methods and scientific assumptions, and philosophy of science comes into view more
easily compared to ELSA approaches. This paper is intended as a first demonstration
of what philosophy of science research has to offer an RRI framework for nanomedicine
with a focus on reductionist assumptions and choices in causal modeling.
There are numerous definitions of ‘nanomedicine’, one of the most frequent being
‘the application of nanotechnology to health’ (European Commission 2005, 2006). European
policy documents describe nanotechnology as ‘the study of phenomena and fine-tuning
of materials at atomic, molecular and macromolecular scales, where properties differ
significantly from those at a larger scale’ (European Commission 2013). Nanomedicine
has become an interdisciplinary subject area and is surrounded by huge expectations. The
European research strategy focuses on developing the use of nanotechnology in targeted
drug delivery, diagnostic in vivo imaging, and in regenerative medicine (European
Commission 2006, 2009). It is also a goal to make nanomedicine more personalized as
well as more cost-effective than other approaches. Current nanotechnological research
enables novel applications such as imaging, measuring, modeling, and manipulation
of nano-sized matter. It helps to reveal mechanisms of disease, to refine molecular
diagnostics, and to discover, develop, and deliver drugs (e.g. Hrkach et al. 2012).
Recent ELSA research on issues related to nanomedicine is focused mainly on the
risk of undesired impacts. Risk and safety are major concerns, such as possible health
risks due to toxicity both when nanomaterials are used in the human body and when
exposed to the environment (Resnik and Tinkle 2007; Manchikanti and Bandopadhyay
2010). Regulative issues (e.g. Guerra 2008) are also debated, as is the question of access
to health care and a possible economic nano-divide between those with access to the
technology and those without (Hodge et al. 2007; Maclurcan 2009). In other discussions,
scholars take issue with personalized medicine (e.g. Pellé and Nurock 2012) and ethical
aspects of nanomedicine in clinical trials (e.g. Berger et al. 2008). There is also the
question of the use of nanotechnology for human enhancement (e.g. Hassoun 2008;
Ferrari et al. 2012). While these are important discussions, few have so far exposed
basic and implicit assumptions of nanomedical research.
According to EGE opinion no. 21 (European Commission 2007, 60), more research
and a deeper understanding should be promoted concerning ‘the broader questions of
nanomedicine, among other things individual responsibility, including the shifts in the
concept of the self, personal identity, societal goals, and global health care’. There are
foundational aspects of nanomedicine with potentially important implications for these
questions. As recognized by Khushf (2007), ethical analysis should also consider some of
the reductionist assumptions in models integral to nanomedicine to keep the broader
perspectives of nanomedicine under public scrutiny.
Studies of social and societal aspects of science, often labelled Science and Technology
Studies (STS), include discussions of the reductive aspects of emerging sciences (e.g.
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paper press the philosophy of science viewpoint, analyzing scientific activity from within
and looking at the specific processes of modeling and explanation. What I am suggesting
is that analyzing foundational issues related to emerging sciences from a philosophy of
science perspective remains of great relevance to societal, ethical, and policy questions
in a manner that is undervalued.
I will address some of the assumptions and basic views related to reduction and
causation in nanomedical research and suggest how they have significant ethical relevance.
I especially address the assumption that ‘root causes’ of diseases are to be found at the
molecular level. I also indicate the manner in which the call for more philosophy of
science fits in to the transition from ELSA to RRI in European biotech research.Reduction and systems approaches in biology, medicine, and nanomedicine
In the philosophical literature, reduction comes in many variations including ontological,
methodological, and epistemic reduction. Discussions among philosophers of science has
long mainly concerned the relation between scientific theories debating for instance the
questions whether classical genetics theory and concepts can be reduced to molecular
genetics theory and concepts (Schaffner 1967; Hull 1974). More recently, however,
this approach to reduction in the biological sciences has been deemed less fruitful, and
there is now more focus on the role of reduction in explanation (Waters 1990; Bickle
2003) and its relation to accounts of causation (Dupre 1993; Strand and Oftedal 2009).
The modes of reduction that have been especially prominent and very successful in
many biological approaches are methodological and epistemic reduction. The most
widespread way to gain knowledge about living systems has been to break them into
parts and look at them individually and in interaction with one or a smaller selection
of other parts. Such an approach may also bring with it explanatory reduction, that is,
the process of explaining the workings of living systems from the workings of (some
of ) its parts. In this paper I use the term reduction in an epistemic-explanatory way
and refer to the following aspects. Reduction involves (1) investigating parts and
mechanisms in order to understand a system in a bottom-up manner; (2) explaining
an effect by only selected causes and/or only at some specific level/scale of interest;
(3) ascribing causal responsibility mainly to lower levels, typically the molecular level; and/
or (4) assuming the independence of composite mechanisms (=modularity assumptions).
Often several or all of these aspects are involved in biomedical/nanomedical research
(e.g. Kim et al. 2010).
Reductive approaches are by no means exclusive to nanomedicine, although there
are several aspects of nanomedicine differing from molecular genetics and other
biological research approaches in this respect. These differences include the possibility
of conducting extremely precise interventions at nano-scale levels. There are also
new applications such as real-time detection and monitoring technologies, where
researchers are no longer dependent on traditional intervention experiments, but can
follow molecular processes in real time (e.g. Berthing et al. 2011; Panikkanvalappil
et al. 2013). These possibilities are already in play and may open numerous molecular
black boxes. In summary, new applications in nanomedicine turn reduction into something
more concrete compared to previous approaches. We can now, and probably even more
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brings new dimensions to reduction in science.
Sometimes reduction is portrayed as inherently negative and part of a naïve realist/
reductionist scientific worldview (e.g. Wynne 2005). It is more fruitful, I hold, to view
reduction as a scientific tool needed in research. Scientists for the most seem to
acknowledge that their models give a simplified picture of a slice of reality in which
certain features are accented and others ignored. Such a view of scientific modeling is
comparable to R. Giere’s (2006) perspectival realism. Focusing on certain aspects is
needed to be able to examine the portion of the world under investigation. Importantly,
however, choices in modeling affect what causes of a phenomenon of interest are revealed
and accentuated (assuming a phenomenon typically has many causes). It should be far
better communicated that the causes under investigations are only a small selection
from a complex network of causal factors. Many aspects are left in the fringes or out
of the picture. These choices should be made more explicit, discussed, and understood. If
scientists are not careful, conscious, and communicative about dealing with simplifications
and partial explanations, it could result first in a biased understanding of causal relations
and second in biased policies regarding the implementation of interventions such as those
affecting people’s health.
Systems approaches have recently enabled researchers to focus on larger and larger
portions of the world simultaneously. These methods demand more and more complex
modeling – often at the cost of manageability and comprehensibility. Still, even complex
models need to focus on a limited number of aspects and features of the world. For
instance, many systems biology models based on large amounts of data depict network
properties (e.g. connectivity) in a defined system rather than detailing molecular
mechanisms (e.g. van der Greef et al. 2007).
Ahn et al. 2006 present a timely analysis of reduction in medicine. The pervading
paradigm in medicine is, they suggest, reductionism in the sense that we typically focus
on one factor as a disease cause or target for disease intervention (corresponding to aspect
number 2 defined above). We typically also treat diseases in an additive manner; we
treat each disease in a disease complex as an independent phenomenon instead of
addressing connections and interactions between different pathologies in the same
individual (corresponding to aspect 4 defined above). Additionally, models in established
medicine are typically linear, predictable, and frequently deterministic; health is seen as
normalcy, risk reduction, and homeostasis. As an alternative or complementary approach,
Ahn et al. 2006 propose the systems perspective used in current systems biology. Many
systems approaches focus on several causal factors simultaneously and pay attention to
context and complex interactions. Models are typically non-linear and sensitive to initial
conditions, and health is viewed as robustness and adaptation/plasticity.
Nanomedical research often involves systems approaches where a large amount of
factors are considered simultaneously and where the focus is on systemic output of
nano-intervention and knowledge of interactions between many system components
(see Bradbury et al. 2008). But even though systems biologists and nanomedical researchers
may claim they apply non-reductionist approaches (see Boogerd et al. 2007), there are
important ways in which many current systems approaches are still reductionist. And
while context is allowed to play a more prominent role and more factors are assessed
simultaneously in systems approaches, they are typically only internal factors (cell-internal
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pathways (corresponding to aspects 1 and 3 above). Thus the molecular level is salient
and even more important in systems-oriented medicine than in past medical research.
Researchers are still taking complex systems apart and explaining from lower levels,
the difference is that they can juggle more parts and more interactions between parts
at the same time. Nanomedicine can therefore be viewed as both a more reductive
option (more focus on lower-level causes and mechanisms) and a less reductive option
(more use of systems approaches taking into account many factors simultaneously
and allow for more complex modeling of disease interactions). Although many current
systems biology approaches are reductionist in the sense discussed above, there are
schools in the life sciences that are non-reductionist in the sense that they address
higher- level principles rather than lower-level mechanisms (see e.g. Wolkenhauer
and Green 2013).
Finally, a way in which nanomedicine is reductionist (corresponding to aspect 2
above), similar to most research in the life sciences, is that it does not take into account
aspects of human beings such as personhood, feeling of self, free will and responsibility.
Questions of health and disease are typically strongly connected to our self-image: who
we are, how we cope, how we act in the world. There is a danger that such aspects,
and other factors, such as environmental, social and psychosocial conditions, may be
even more suppressed in future medicine. The possibility of precise molecular diagnosis
and treatment excites researchers and funding bodies. Medicine has for a long time
had a strong molecular perspective, but with nanomedicine, health and disease could
be moved to the molecular scale to an even larger degree than before. In the next
section, I elaborate on why this is not justified.
There is, however, an important complication in the discussion of nanomedicine
which may preclude the understanding of more foundational assumptions. Two sides
of nanomedicine clash in their portrayal and understanding of the science, and one is
more reductionist than the other. On the one hand, there is the clinical, practical and
incremental side to nanomedicine where the technology is seen as one of tools to solve
clinical problems. In this approach, there is believed to be continuity in the development
of medical research and practice where research approaches and ethical issues of
nanomedicine can be expected to be similar to previous and parallel approaches.
Researchers that find themselves well placed in this more pragmatic research focus
on nanomedicine have problems seeing anything particularly new about nanomedicine or
possible ethical concerns of nanomedical research (e.g. Kuiken 2010). Costa et al. 2011
found that many scientists reflect with ambiguity on the reputed novelty of nanomedicine
and what the ethical issues and risks are in their work. Researchers often see no need for a
shift in ethical considerations, but view ethical issues in nanomedicine as overlapping
with those of other areas of biomedical research (Wickson et al. 2008).
On the other hand, there is a more visionary side to nanomedicine which is promoting
a whole new approach to medicine as a practice (Leontis and Agich 2010). This side
includes more speculative science writers like R. Freitas (1999), where we find nano-
medicine portrayed as involving highly reductionist representations of biological systems
and of human health and disease. According to Freitas (1999), “nanomedicine phenom-
enologically regards the human body as an intricately structured machine with trillions
of complex, interacting parts, with each part subject to individual scrutiny, repair, and
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produced molecular-level descriptions of a system, we can directly apply nanotechno-
logical engineering principles to prevent, diagnose and treat at the molecular level
(Khushf 2007, 518).
Many researchers consider these descriptions of nanomedicine to be fairly remote
from everyday pragmatic research and say little of the work and assumptions of the
actual working scientists (see Wickson et al. 2008). However, the line between science
and science fiction is effectively blurred also by researchers and policy makers using
similar formulations. In the initial American NIH Nanomedicine Roadmap Initiative
disease is sometimes referred to as ‘a broken part of a cell’, and a long-term goal for
nanomedicine is partly defined as being able to replace such a broken part ‘with a mini-
ature biological machine’ (Tibbals 2011, 52). Although European reports tend to be more
modest, there are nevertheless formulations expressing a single-cell understanding of
disease in nanomedicine: “In nanodiagnostics, the ultimate goal is to identify disease at the
earliest stage possible, ideally at the level of a single cell” (European Commission 2005).
Discussions of reduction in nanomedicine must be careful not to confuse the more
speculative visions with assumptions in actual research and applications. A useful
philosophy of science treatment of reduction in nanomedicine I think should mainly
concern the latter, and some effort will be needed to separate them.Causation and levels
A worry expressed by Khushf (2008) is the inability of a biomedical disease concept
based on reduction and molecular-level causation to capture the complexities of disease
and reality of clinical medicine. According to Khushf, the ‘root cause’ of disease is often
considered as a “dysfunction of a tissue because of pathology on a cellular or subcellular
level” (quoted from Kelly 2006, 1026). “The clinical problems that physicians address
involve failures of function at relatively high system levels, and these are traced to failures
in tissue function, which, in turn, arise from cellular and subcellular processes. If we
want a properly scientific understanding of disease, we thus need to trace things all
the way down” (Khushf 2008, 434). There is an assumption that disease is caused by
some underlying defect at a subsystem level, or that disease somehow originates from
lower levels.
A view of complex causation that is close to modern research approaches and that I
will use as a basis for the discussion, is that any biological state, condition, or pathology
should be considered to be caused by a larger causal complex, each causal factor of
which can be defined counterfactually as something that would have made a difference
to the effect in question if it had been changed through an intervention (Woodward
2003).a Biomedical researchers typically choose a research focus on certain causes or
causal pathways because intervening in these pathways is a feasible way of influencing
disease conditions given the research context at hand. The chosen causal factors are to be
considered as objective causes of the condition in question as long as they are difference-
makers, but as discussed in the following, they are not necessarily root causes.
Biological levels are often defined as levels of composition or organization, where
higher levels are composed by lower-level constituents (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958;
Wimsatt 1994). In this paper I refer to a compositional understanding of levels, however,
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of level relations. Although molecules constitute cell components, which constitute
cells, which constitute tissues, which constitute organisms, most levels are composed
by components from several other levels. For instance tissues are not merely composed by
cells but also extracellular matrix and free-floating molecules and ions. In nanoscience the
concept of scale is often invoked replacing much level-talk. The scale concept is typically
used without referring to composition, but rather indicates the size-range under focus
(see e.g. Berger et al. 2008).
It is commonly assumed that when something happens at a higher level (e.g. a change
in some tissue functionality, say the beating of the heart), something also happens at
the molecular level. There cannot be change in higher level properties without changes
at lower levels (what philosophers like to call the supervenience thesis) (Davidson 1970;
Kim 1993). While this supervenience thesis is not accepted by everybody, I will assume
that most researchers in nanomedicine and molecular biology do. But even if we do
accept it, it is important to notice what does not follow from it. It does not follow that
even if changes do take place at the molecular level that the main cause of an effect is
also at the molecular level. Causes can be mediated through molecular mechanisms,
still leaving the major difference-making causes larger than molecules (see e.g. Craver
and Bechtel 2007). For instance eating a specific culturally influenced diet (higher
level cause) can affect your health in significant ways mediated through specific
molecular pathways in the body. Breaking up with your boyfriend (higher level
cause) may induce a depression causally mediated by certain brain molecular activity.
Medical research may produce knowledge and drugs making it possible to intervene
directly in the mediating molecular pathways and thereby restore health partially or
fully. Say that we are able to change a pathological process by intervention at the
molecular level. Even though this is possible, it is important that it does not follow
from this that the molecular cause(s) on which the drug or treatment in question
has intervened is the main cause or ‘root cause’ of the condition in the first place.
An example from nanomedicine research concerning the treatment of obesity illustrates
this (Kajimoto et al. 2013). The drug Cytochrome C was delivered through a nanosystem
causing vascular changes in cells ultimately reducing body-weight in mice with a high-fat
diet. Although the intuitive root cause in this case is external (diet), the obesity is still
mediated by molecular mechanisms that can be intervened on, and obesity may
therefore be remedied without changing the diet.
One can of course ask what qualifies a certain diet as a ‘root cause’ and not some
molecular process or property as long as we take diseases typically to be caused by a
causal complex rather than single and simple causes. ‘Root cause’ is not a well-defined
concept, and I will suggest describing it in relation to what has been the normal causal
context for a longer period of time. Often we may have an intuition about what is the
root cause of a phenomenon. The following is a simplified example, for the case of the
argument. While genetic variants affecting people’s likelihood of becoming obese have
been there for a long time, the frequent occurrence of a certain type of diet combined
with low activity levels is a newer phenomenon. Since it is the diet that has changed
and not the genetic variation, the diet can be considered the ‘root cause’ of increased
obesity. On the other hand, if our diet had been constant over a longer period (e.g. several
generations), genetic variation should rather have been considered ‘root cause’ of variation
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than as referring to an objective main cause of a phenomenon.
Although biomedical research often seeks to understand biological mechanisms and
the molecular causes of disease, in practice researchers address several levels of
organization simultaneously. For instance, in emerging nanomedical cancer therapies,
tumor tissue and cancerous cells are targeted or reached through intervening in specific
biological mechanisms, for instance through targeting specific cell receptors (e.g. Ashley
et al. 2011). Several relevant levels are in play in this research: molecules, transport
systems in cells, cells, tissues and organism. It is an interesting question how the relations
between relevant levels in this research should be described and the roles they play in
models and explanations investigated.
Khushf (2008, 432) asks for a richer account of top-down causation in our under-
standing of disease. The question of top-down causation is extensive and has been a
central topic in philosophy for some time (e.g. Craver and Bechtel 2007; Auletta et al.
2008). Some see top-down causation as mysterious and non-scientific, since in science
one hardly finds any higher-level phenomena that are not dependent on what is going
on at lower levels. There are still accounts of top-down causation which do not appeal
to such mysterious forces and do not really challenge the supervenience thesis. One
such account is to consider top-down causation as constraints on the working of the
parts coming from higher-level organizational principles or boundary conditions (van
Gulick 1995; Emmeche et al. 2000). The fact that molecules are organized in different
ways and shaped in different structures puts important constraints on causal relations.
Another species of top-down causation that has been suggested is the effect of external/
environmental causes on organisms (Craver and Bechtel 2007). Some will still argue
that what is called top-down causation always acts via the molecular level, even
though it is better described or identified by a higher-level vocabulary, in which case
no real top-down causation is going on. I will not try to resolve these issues here. Suffice
it to say that the concept of levels in living systems ties in with how we view health
and disease, and is a question that needs more attention.
Craver and Bechtel (2007) hold that what is sometimes mistakenly considered to
be top-down or bottom-up causation really are not causal relations at all, but rather
constitutional relations. The main reasoning behind this is that something cannot be a
part of a whole and a cause of that whole at the same time. A whole is not caused by
its parts; rather, it is constituted by its parts. Taking this reasoning on board, a lot of
what people have discussed as top-down causation is rather constitutional relations. A
more thorough discussion of the implications of this view for concepts of disease and
health should be investigated. A richer account of top-down causation (or constitutional
relations) is definitely needed, and importantly, body-external causes and causal contexts
need to be acknowledged to a greater degree both by researchers and in research commu-
nication to avoid fostering an overly simplified understanding of disease causation.
As pointed to, there is a relationship between the aspects of causation and levels
discussed here with reduction as defined in the previous section. Holding root causes
mainly to reside on the molecular level corresponds to reduction as described in the
three first aspects: It involves an approach in which parts are investigated to understand a
system in a bottom-up manner; it is an attempt to explain an effect by selected causes
at one main level; and it is an ascription of causal responsibility mainly to lower
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the possibility of ascribing causal responsibility to higher-level causes and how this
can be conceptualized.The relevance of philosophy of science perspectives
Science is very often about surprises. Researchers find something they did not expect at
all or latch onto an entirely different research path because what they investigate just
behaves completely differently than originally hypothesized. Although research results
often reflect specific interests and are definitely parts of social and historical context
and also need to be evaluated in this light, there is also a way in which natural science
has a claim to objectivity. No matter how strong your interests and biases, they do not
decide how the world behaves when you interact with it, even though they may invite
of certain interpretations of the behavior.
In nanomedicine choices have been made to interact with the world with a focus on
certain questions, certain levels, certain forms of explanation and types of intervention.
This focus seems extraordinarily fruitful and successful; it creates knowledge about
biological mechanisms and how to develop new and significant applications in medicine.
Nevertheless, it is still important to keep in mind that this is one type of focus with
an interest in certain causes. A significant problem with the contemporary tendency
towards reduction and privileging of certain causal models is that other potentially
fruitful approaches, such as the investigation of higher-level causes (e.g. psychological,
sociological, and environmental causes) and some low-tech preventative approaches
(e.g. diet) remain under-investigated. Nanomedicine may well continue as it does and
give wonderful results. It is still important for funding bodies to remain vigilant to
ensure this research does not absorb resources at the expense of investigations into
other highly relevant aspects of disease. Given the magnitude of market interest in
nanomedicine, state funding bodies have an even greater responsibility to ensure a better
balance between approaches. Current medical research could also benefit from other per-
spectives and incorporate external factors and combine factors in multilevel approaches.
One worry is that the framework of nanomedicine will push medicine in a specific
direction where most pathologies, when it comes down to it, should be addressed at
the molecular level, and where the development of treatments that fight molecular
causes of disease is generally seen as the most effective solution to health problems. This
attitude would also be beneficial to and expected to be promoted by drug companies. It
could also be the most effective approach to health issues, but it is far from self-evident,
and we need conceptual tools to be able to discuss these matters.
It is of great interest to understand reductionist assumptions of significant scientific
approaches and how they influence our understanding and conceptualization of higher-
level phenomena. What is lost in reductive approaches? The understanding of how
concepts of disease and health are influenced by nanomedical reduction is of ethical
concern. As sketched in this paper, a first lesson from philosophy of science is not to
lose sight of external, environmental, higher-level causes of disease and be aware of the
possibility of people getting more estranged from their health and their bodies (the disease
is in the molecules), which may also affect feelings of responsibility in relation to own
health. I would also point to the importance of communicating better the complexities
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understand ourselves as biological beings as well as persons in sickness and in health.Widening the scope of RRI and ELSA research
In the ELSA/RRI literature on nanoscience and nanotechnology, several authors have called
for a philosophy of science component able to address issues of foundational assumptions
of nanoscience; such a component should be integrated into a more comprehensive
approach to addressing nanoscience in society (e.g. Khushf 2007; Grunwald 2011).
Responsibility involves both moral and epistemic dimensions (e.g. Grunwald 2011,
12). There is a moral dimension to how an action can be deemed responsible or
irresponsible, and there is an epistemic dimension related to the quality of knowledge
of the subject of responsibility, which in this context is scientific knowledge. The
quality of knowledge is connected to the quality of methods, approaches, and frame-
work of research, in which reductive assumptions and causal modeling are significant
components. Questions of how we can acquire scientific knowledge, what status this
knowledge has, and what assumptions are shaping the approaches taken, are classical epis-
temology and philosophy of science questions that I hold will prove important in an
RRI perspective.
There is a conceptual shift in European research as RRI partly takes over from ELSA
as a framework for addressing important concerns regarding the effects of new tech-
nologies on society and environment. Although the concept of RRI is not yet fully de-
veloped, it has been introduced in part to facilitate a better integration of ethical, societal,
and risk aspects into on-going biotech research and to promote interdisciplinary cooper-
ation and exchange among practitioners in the natural sciences, social sciences, and the
humanities. A practical implication is that research into ethical and social aspects is sup-
posed to be funded through the biotech projects, not as independent projects, creat-
ing closer dependencies between scientists and RRI/ELSA researchers. This may
result in closer collaboration, but may also promote more ‘tailor-made’ RRI research
to fit the relevant projects.
Research under the ELSA framework has not had much focus on philosophy of science
issues, but such research could easily be incorporated into ELSA to a greater extent.
And as discussed in the beginning of this paper, the RRI framework seems, considering
some of its visions and values so far, very promising when it comes to integrating more
philosophy of science research. On the other hand, the expected close integration of
RRI with ongoing research projects may provide some challenges for more foundational
investigations of scientific concepts and assumptions. One reason is that this work
may be of more general relevance than of direct relevance to specific projects. Still, if
funding bodies take into account the importance of investigating philosophy of science
issues in an RRI framework, and philosophers focus at making their work more directly
interesting to current research, it is still feasible to integrate philosophy of science
questions into on-going projects.Endnote
aOne problem of counterfactual definitions of disease causation is that biological
systems typically are robust and may compensate for the disturbance/intervention on
Oftedal Life Sciences, Society and Policy 2014, 10:5 Page 11 of 12
http://www.lsspjournal.com/content/10/1/5many factors in the system in a way that makes these factors not appear as causes
since the effect seems not to be counterfactually dependent on them. Strand and
Oftedal 2013 present one possible solution to this problem for counterfactual accounts
of causation.
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